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EARLY DRAFT

Harmony and Disharmony in International Patent Law
East‐West Center Think Piece by Colleen V. Chien1
February 1, 2016 DRAFT
One of the purposes of the Trans‐Pacific Partnership (TPP) is to harmonize standards and create
a uniform climate for trade and investment. As lawmakers deliberate the terms of the deal,
they must consider what the long‐term impact of agreeing to its sweeping provisions will be. As
they do so, they should keep in mind that the gaps between the agreed‐upon principles and
local implementation, and the differences between local implementation – some of them by
design – are often quite great. Drawing upon the existing literature, this short essay provides a
survey of the extent of harmony and disharmony in the 20 years that have passed since
ratification of the TRIPS agreement, with a focus on its patent provisions. After considering the
framework for harmonization that the TPP and TRIPS share, I discuss and provide examples of
three types of differences: differences between the minimum standards that are negotiated
and compliance with them, differences between the substantive principles agreed to and the
actual laws that implement them (and the procedural contexts in which they operate), and
differences between the laws as enacted and the laws that are applied.
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Introduction
The purpose of trade agreements is to reduce barriers to trade. The rationale for
including intellectual property provisions within such agreements is that, although patent and
copyright laws are unlike tariffs, differences between the patent laws of various countries will
discourage trade as it increases the cost of complying with varied, non‐harmonized regimes. If
countries agree, for example, that changing the formulation of a pharmaceutical drug is a
patentable advance, a pharmaceutical company can rely on that knowledge to make long‐term
investments in such improvements, and not worry about the availability of exclusive rights. A
single, international level of protection enables countries to focus on their respective strengths,
and to capture efficiencies that flow from comparative advantage.
Efforts to harmonize intellectual property law internationally date back to 1883, with
the adoption of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property ("Paris
Convention"), whose most notable achievement was to establish the principle of national
treatment.2 The Trade‐Related Aspects on Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement is the
most important and comprehensive modern international intellectual property (IP) treaty, with
the goal of establishing minimum substantive international standards. Its adoption in 1995 in
many ways was a landmark, encompassing over 150 countries, and establishing mechanisms for
dealing with noncompliance.3 Two decades later, the IP Chapter of the Trans‐Pacific Partnership
(TPP) proposes to harmonize policies relating to patents, regulatory test data, trademarks,
geographical indications, copyrights, trade secrets, IP enforcement, criminal penalties for trade
secret theft, IP liability for state‐owned enterprise, anti‐counterfeiting provisions, and
additional subject matter,4 among over a dozen countries.5 As with TRIPS, TPP would require
changes in law in order to comply with mandatory obligations created under the agreement.
Regardless of what the actual provisions say, the way in which the agreement, like
TRIPs, was actually formed – secretively, without the benefit of public deliberation and debate,
and only by coupling IP with many other areas, which is perceived to have enabled developed
countries to use their markets as leverage to force stronger IP provisions in exchange for
greater market access – create legitimacy problems 6 that imperil its adoption.7 The IP
2

Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Leahy‐Smith America Invents Act, a New Paradigm for International
Harmonisation? 24 Sing. Acad. L.J. 669, __ (2012)
3
William J. Davey, the WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years, 8 J. Int’l Econ. L. 17, 32 (2005).
4
U.S. Trade Representative Blog, The Trans‐Pacific Partnership (Nov. 5, 2015), https://medium.com/the‐trans‐
pacific‐partnership/intellectual‐property‐3479efdc7adf#.ygpf5a1hv
5
The United States, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru,
Singapore, and Vietnam
6
Dreyfuss, supra note ___, at 677.
7
Colleen V. Chien and Quentin Palfrey, One Last Chance For A Pro‐Transparency Trade Legacy for Obama (working
title), 2016
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provisions have consistently been among the most controversial, called a deal that the whole
world may have to pay the “price [of] in the form of worse health and unnecessary deaths” by
Nobel prize winner Joseph Stiglitz for example. They have attracting stinging criticism for
overrepresenting the interests of contentholders8 as a result of informational and institutional
capture caused in part by the systematic departure of trade negotiators from the government
and into the private sectors who they were once regulating.9
However high, the costs might be worth it, to TPP proponents, if the goal of TPP – the
achievement of uniformly high standards – is achieved. But the track record of TRIPS twenty
years after its passage creates much doubt. On one hand, TRIPS, notwithstanding its flexibilities,
has been criticized for discouraging experimentation among public policies in a way consistent
with flexibilities provided by the Act.10 But on the other hand, rightsholders, disappointed with
how TRIPS has been implemented, particularly with respect to compulsory licensing, have
shifted their focus to other policy regimes and venues.11 The failures of many of these attempts
(e.g. the Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT) and Anti‐Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(ACTA)) suggest that the consensus that TRIPS was able to achieve was remarkable.
Disharmony by Design
TRIPS and TPP share some features that make it worthwhile to consider TRIPS’ record of
harmonization when evaluating TPP’s prospects. Some of the disharmony among countries’
implementations of TRIPS has been by design – as recounted below, the TRIPS Agreement (and
subsequent amendments) incorporate safeguards that affirm countries’ sovereignty, the
relevance of competitive interests, frameworks for deviating from the agreement, and
commitments to access to medicines. So, largely, does TPP.
Any difference in the implementation of TRIPS standards, therefore, might have been
predicted, for example, by its opening Article, which states that member countries “shall give
effect to the provisions of this Agreement. Members may, but shall not be obliged to,
implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided
that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement. Members shall be
free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement
8

Timothy B. Lee, Here’s why Obama trade negotiators push the interests of Hollywood and drug companies,
November 26, 2013. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the‐switch/wp/2013/11/26/heres‐why‐obama‐
trade‐negotiators‐push‐the‐interests‐of‐hollywood‐and‐drug‐companies/
9
Timothy B. Lee, Here’s why Obama trade negotiators push the interests of Hollywood and drug companies,
November 26, 2013. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the‐switch/wp/2013/11/26/heres‐why‐obama‐
trade‐negotiators‐push‐the‐interests‐of‐hollywood‐and‐drug‐companies/
10
See, e.g. Molly Land, Rebalancing TRIPS, 33 Mich. J. Int’l L. 433, 434 (2012).
11
See generally Peter Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles’ Heel (Drake University Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
Research Paper No. 11‐31, 2011).
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within their own legal system and practice.”12 TPP’s IP chapter uses exactly the same
language.13 In addition, TRIPS does not purport to replace substantive IP laws, rather it only
imposes minimum standards upon all member countries of the WTO. The language of the
agreement specifically allows TRIPS members, when shaping their domestic laws and
regulations, to “adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio‐economic and
technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of
this Agreement,”14 as well as to take “appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent
with the provisions of this Agreement, [] to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by
right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect
the international transfer of technology.” 15 Article 18.3 of the TPP incorporates this language
verbatim and extends on it, as described below.
The principal that exceptions and limitations to the agreement are permitted under
certain limited circumstances is enshrined in both agreements.16 So, too, is the Doha
Declaration, which in 2001 confirmed that “patents would not prohibit countries’ ability to use
compulsory licensing to address public health needs,”17 and the 2005 amendment to Article 31
of the TRIPS agreement, which enabled countries lacking the capacity to manufacture generic
pharmaceuticals under domestic compulsory licenses to import them.18
In 2014, prominent IP scholars across the world drafted the Declaration on Patent
Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS, in order to “clarify some of the regulatory
options states still retain under international law, in particular the TRIPS Agreement.”19 Drawing
upon some of the flexibilities cited earlier, as well as other provisions of the law, the
Declaration interprets, potentially too expansively,20 the regulatory discretion that national
legislators have in implementing their own patent systems.21 However, some provisions leave
less room for discretion. Article 33 specifies that “the term of protection available shall not end
12

Dongwook Chun, Justifying Patent Harmonization, 12 Asper Rev. Int’l Bus. & Trade L. 99, 100 (2012).
TPP Article 18.5
14
TRIPS, art. 8.
15
Id.
16
Otherwise known as the “three‐step test”; cf. TRIPS Articles 17, 26, and 30 and TPP Articles 18.21, 18.40, and
18.65.
17
Donald Harris, TRIPS after Fifteen Years: Success or Failure, as Measured by Compulsory Licensing, 18 J. Intell.
Pro. L. 367, 386 (2011).
18
Id.
19
Matthias Lamping etc. al., Declaration on Patent Protection ‐ Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS, 45 IIC ‐ Int’l
Rev. Intell. Prop. & Competition L. 679 (2014).
20
Rochelle Dreyfuss & Estaban Donoso, On Aiding Technical Development: the Max Planck Declaration on Patent
Protection, 6 U.C. Irvine L. Rev., forthcoming. (Abstract), calling the Declaration’s interpretation of the flexibilities
afforded by TRIPS “aggressive” and failing to give guidance to countries that seek to maximize innovation, as
opposed to consumer interests.
21
Lamping et al., supra note ___
13
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before the expiration of a period of twenty years counted from the filing date,” seemingly
foreclosing proposals for differential terms, e.g. shorter for certain technology patents, and
longer for certain drug patents,22 for different types of inventions.
In the sections that follow, I draw upon existing literature to describe the ways in which
harmony within international agreements accommodates, and in some cases supports, the
disharmonies foreshadowed by these provisions, as well as forces harmonization where it
would not otherwise have happened. Part I looks in particular at compliance with TRIPS’
mandates, and finds that the record of dispute resolution procedures supports that TRIPS has
allowed for significant country‐level tailoring, though it has also, taking the example of the US,
compelled countries to both take and abstain from actions it would not have taken in the
absence of the agreement. Part II explores variations in country‐level implementation of the
inventive step requirement in patent law and the design of post‐grant patent challenges. Part III
reviews “twin” patent application studies, including my own, that trace what happens when the
same patent application is filed in multiple jurisdictions, demonstrating that even standards
that are harmonized can lead to dramatically different outcomes when applied.
Part I: Disharmonies in TRIPS Compliance
Countries that do not comply with TRIPS provisions are subject to dispute resolution
procedures to ensure their compliance. One way to assess the extent to which TRIPS has
achieved its harmonization aims is through the dispute settlement system within the WTO.
Reviewing 15 years of dispute settlement proceedings, Joost Pauwelyn has concluded that
TRIPS was “the dog that barked but did not bite,”23 by which he means that concerns that TRIPS
would significantly constrain national policy formation have largely not materialized. Pauwelyn
reports that 23 of the 27 TRIPS disputes filed in the first 15 years following TRIPS enactment
were lodged during the first five years of TRIPS (at an annual rate of between 3 and 6 cases),
but that since 2000, less than 1 case has been brought per year, on average. There has been no
“flood of IP disputes,” no aggressive enforcement by developed against developing countries,
and TRIPS disputes settled more frequently than other WTO disputes (67% v. 58%).24

22

See, e.g. Tabarrock, Alexander, Patent Theory and Patent Law, 1 Contributions to Econ. Analysis & Pol’y 1 (2002);
Benjamin N. Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based on Time‐to‐Market, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 672 (2004) and
other references described in Brian J. Love, Chapter on Patent Duration, Handbook of Peter S. Menell & David L.
Schwartz (eds.), Research Handbook on the Economics of Intellectual Property Law (Vol. II ‐‐ Analytical Methods)
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016)
23

Joost Pauwelyn, The Dog that Barked that Didn’t Bite: 15 Years of Intellectual Property Disputes at the WTO, 1 J.
Int’l Disp. Settlement 389 (2010).
24
Id.
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Edward Lee’s parallel study does not dispute these findings, but does point out that
fears that developed countries would use the Agreement to force changes in others’ laws has
not been entirely unfounded.25 While there have been few IP disputes, the majority of them
have been initiated by the United States and Europe.26 However, the targets of the disputes
have also been developed countries, again, with the United States, Europe, and Canada all
found to have been in violation.27 Strikingly, the United States is the only country to have been
found in violation of TRIPS provisions that has, of yet, failed to change its laws in order to
comply. (See Table ___).

Table __: Times Taken by Member Countries to Comply with Decisions Finding TRIPS Violations

Source: Edward Lee, Measuring TRIPS Compliance and Defense: the WTO Compliance
Scoreboard, 18 J. Intell. Prop. L. 401 (2011). *Compliance times for the US calculated as of 2011.
However, to initiate a dispute requires significant governmental resources and much of
the shaping of national laws happens in the shadow of dispute resolution, including through
technical assistance. In addition, commentators have noted that United States enforcement
efforts seem to have moved away from the multilateral WTO dispute settlement system and
reverted to unilateral efforts such as the Special 301,28 a mechanism that allows for a possible
retaliatory trade action against a country which fails to provide adequate protection for United
States’ IP rights, as well as through the pursuit of commitments that go beyond TRIPS (“TRIPS‐
plus”), in TPP and other recent free trade agreements.29 As a result, dispute resolution

25

Edward Lee, Measuring TRIPS Compliance and Defense: the WTO Compliance Scoreboard, 18 J. Intell. Prop. L.
401 (2011).
26
Id. at 405.
27
Id. at 410.
28
Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2010 Special 301 Report, Annex 1 (2010), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/web/frm_send/1906
29
Harris, supra note __ at 374.
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outcomes provide at best an incomplete indicia of the extent to which TRIPS has succeeded or
failed in its aims.
Another way of measuring the harmonizing power of international IP agreements is the
degree to which agreements have been the “but‐for” cause of domestic activities – compelling
countries to take or not take steps, because of an agreement, and conversely, failing to prevent
the adoption of measures that, in theory at least, contravene the aims of its provisions. A
review of the experience of the United States provides examples of all three dynamics. For
example, over the objections of a number of stakeholders including independent inventors and
Nobel Laureates,30 it passed provisions of the America Invents Act “with an eye toward
harmonization,”31 by moving the United States in the direction of the rest of the world through
its substantial adoption of a first‐to‐file system, expansion of source of prior art to all
geographies, and limiting of the best mode requirement.32 The United States has also been
prevented by the provisions of the TRIPS agreement that require patent owners to receive 20‐
year terms33 to be able to enact shorter, say three‐ to five‐year durations for software
patents.34 The TRIPS agreement’s commitment to technology neutrality, which requires patents
to be “available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology,”35
at least seemingly, has prevented the United States Congress from enacting laws that would
treat software differently than other types of technological inventions.36 However, it has not
prevented the Supreme Court of the United States from taking significant steps to curtail the
patenting of abstract inventions37 and human genes,38 or prevented Congress from enacting
special provisions to be developed to challenge patents over financial inventions, specifically
excluding “technological inventions”39 to avoid running afoul of TRIPS. These “exceptions” to
technology neutrality in patents join pre‐existing technology‐specific provisions, for example,
that prevent surgeons from being prosecuted for infringement of diagnostic patents in the

30

See Colleen Chien, Exclusionary and Diffusionary Levers in Patent Law, __ Southern Cal. L. Rev. ___ (2016).
Dreyfuss, supra note __ at 679
32
Id. at ___
33
TRIPS Article 33
34
As suggested, e.g. by Richard Posner, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/07/why‐there‐are‐
too‐many‐patents‐in‐america/259725/
35
TRIPS Article 27
36
See Colleen Chien, Tailoring the Patent System to Work for Technology Patents (2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2176520.
37
See, e.g. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010), Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Intern., 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014)
38
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013)
39
Pub. L. 112–29, §18
31
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United States40 and surgical methods from being patented in Japan and the UK,41 and certain
computer programs from being patented in the Europe.42
Part II. Disharmonies in the Application and Contexts of Domestic Patent Law
Though TRIPS has clearly provided harmonizing pressure, it is unclear how deep this
pressure extends. TRIPS and TPP explicitly state that “[m]embers shall be free to determine the
appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal
system and practice.”43 This clearly contemplates that specific provisions implementing the
same legal principle may look quite different from country to country. In addition, the
agreements, as described above, sanction the adoption of measures to address other, non‐
innovation priorities, including public health and technology transfer, although only to the
extent that they are consistent with the other terms of the agreements.44 Article 18.4 of the
TPP includes additional language that acknowledges that the agreement is formed in a broader
context in which Parties need to “(a) promote innovation and creativity; (b) facilitate the
diffusion of information, knowledge, technology, culture and the arts; and (c) foster competition
and open and efficient markets.”45 Below, we provide an example of how countries have used
their discretion to implement one particular requirement – the “inventive step” requirement –
in four different jurisdictions. We then consider the procedural context of patentability
decisions, focusing specifically on post‐grant challenges to patent validity, with reference to the
policies of several countries.
1. Implementation of the “Inventive Step” requirement in the US, India, Japan, and Europe
The TRIPS Agreement requires countries to grant patents to inventions that are “new,
involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.”46 However, countries have
tailored their implementation of this international requirement in response to domestic
pressures and needs.47 In the United States, section 103 of the Patent Act specifies that patents
are to be granted not on inventions that represent an “inventive step” but on those that meet

40

35 U.S.C. 287(c)
Described, e.g. in Toshiko Takenaka, et al., GLOBAL ISSUES IN PATENT LAW 73‐74 (2010).
42
See EPC Article 52
43
Dongwook Chun, Justifying Patent Harmonization, 12 Asper Rev. Int’l Bus. & Trade L. 99, 100 (2012).
44 Described supra, Disharmony by Design
45
TPP Article 18.4
46
TRIPS, art. 27(1).
47
See Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: a Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in India’s
Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 Cal. L. Rev. 1571, 1589 (2009) (commenting on India’s decision to adopt “an
exceptionally high threshold for inventive step”); Timo Minssen, Meanwhile on the Other Side of the Pond: Why
Biopharmaceutical Inventions that were “Obvious to Try” Still Might be Non‐Obvious Part I, 9 Chi.‐Kent J. Intell.
Prop. 60, 61 (2010) (comparing application of the inventive step/obviousness analysis in Europe and the U.S.).
41
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the “nonobviousness” requirement.48 In Europe, according to Article 56 of the European Patent
Convention, “an invention shall be considered as involving an inventive step if, having regard to
the state of the art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art.” The Japanese standard
resembles the US approach, asking: “(1) what is the prior art? (2) what are the differences
between the claimed invention and the prior art? And (3) would the invention be obvious to a
person with ordinary skill in the art?” 49 Europe’s approach, instead, is to ask “(1) what is the
closest prior art? (2) what is the objective problem solved by the invention? And (3) was the
solution reached by the invention obvious to a person with ordinary skill in the art?.”50
The formulations, and how they are interpreted, can also vary. In the US, Congress has
delegated responsibility for patent law largely to the courts, and in 2007, the Supreme Court
reinterpreted the obviousness standard, doing away with the test that had been developed by
the lower appellate court that hears patent cases exclusively – the Federal Circuit – as rigid and
formalistic.51 This decision was one of a string of decisions that were seen as providing a
corrective to the Federal Circuit’s elevation of patent rights over the rights of consumers and
other interests,52 culminating in the Federal Circuit having the highest reversal rate of any
circuit court in the US. From 1999‐2008, the Supreme Court reversed and vacated in 25 of 30
cases on review from the Federal Circuit, a rate of 83.3%.53 The next most‐reversed was the
Ninth Circuit, at 80%, and the median rate across all circuits was 68.29%.54 Considering only
patent appeals, the Federal Circuit’s performance is worse—the Supreme Court reversed and
vacated 13 out of 14 decisions during the 1999‐2008 period.55
India’s inventive step standard has been described as “exceptionally high.”56 It requires
inventions to contain “a feature [] that involves technical advance as compared to the existing
knowledge or having economic significance or both and that makes the invention not obvious
48

35 U.S.C. § 103 (a) (2011) (A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the
claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed
invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the
effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed
invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made)
49
Amy Nelson, Obviousness or Inventive Step as Applied to Nucleic Acid Molecules: a Global Perspective, 6 N.C. J.L.
& Tech. 1, 30 (2004‐05).
50
Id.
51
KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007)
52
Described, e.g. in Chien, Cotter and Posner, Redesigning Patent Law (forthcoming), Chapter 2.
53
Roy E. Hofer, Supreme Court Reversal Rates: Evaluating the Federal Courts of Appeals, 2 Landslide (2010),
available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/intelprop/magazine/LandslideJan2010_Hofer.authcheck
dam.pdf.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: a Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in India’s
Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 Cal. L. Rev. 1571, 1579 (2009).
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to a person skilled in the art,”57 in order to be patentable. In addition to specifying that an
invention be “not obvious to a person skilled in the art,” the US standard, India erects an
additional hurdle – that the invention include a technical advance or have economic
significance – in order to be patentable. Depending on how it is applied, this standard could
likely be used to exclude a host of inventions that might otherwise be patentable based on
standards used by other countries, Amy Kapczynski has observed. 58 She characterizes this
standard, as well as a host of other substantive provisions of the Indian Patent system,
including novel limitations on subject matter, compulsory licensing provisions, patent misuse
standards to constrain voluntary licensing activity, and limits on injunctive remedies, as
evidence of the extensive and underappreciated flexibilities that TRIPS affords.59
2. Post‐Grant Patent Challenges
The impact of harmonized patent standards depends on the procedures that are
available to support their administration, and in particular, procedures that are available to
challenge patents. In Europe, post grant proceedings have long been a well‐recognized way to
correct Patent Office error – opposition proceedings at the European Patent Office (EPO), which
are used to review 5‐8 % of issued patents, have resulted in the partial or total invalidation of
patents close to 70 % of the time, and in German revocation proceedings, 73 % of patents are
partially or fully revoked.60 In recent years, both the US and India have adopted provisions to
challenge patents that, while merely procedural, arguably impact the rights of patentholders
just as significantly as have substantive provisions. The diversity of these provisions
underscores that even when substantive laws are harmonized, they take effect in
disharmonized environments that can include, e.g. variable procedures for challenging patents.
In the US, concerns about low‐quality patents caused by the relaxing of standards by the
Federal Circuit in the 1990s61 led to the redesign of post‐grant challenges in 2011. In the US,
since 1981, patentees and third parties have been able to seek reexamination of issued patents
if a “substantial new question of patentability,”62 with respect to novelty or nonobviousness,
for example, due to a new piece of prior art or a change in the law, is presented. However,
neither ex parte nor inter partes reexam procedures were used much, due in part to their
uncertain review periods and the inability to consider outside evidence.63 The America Invents
Act of 2011 created three new ways for members of the public to challenge issued patents:
inter partes review (IPR), the covered business method transitional program (CBM), and post‑
57

The Patent Amendment Act, No. 15 of 2005, § 2(ja), INDIA CODE (2005).
Kapczynski, supra note __at 1593.
59
Id. at 1589‐1616.
60
For cites, see Colleen Chien & Christian Helmers, Inter Partes Review and the Design of Post‐Grant Patent
Reviews, Stan. Tech. L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming).
61
Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 Fed. Cir. B.J. 539,
____(2012)
62
35 U.S.C. 303(a)
63
Matal, supra note ___, at ____.
58
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grant review (PGR). These redesigned procedures for challenging patents, in particular IPR, have
been much more popular than their predecessors. While the USPTO received an average of 10
requests per year in the first five years of inter partes reexamination, in the second full year of
inter partes review, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) of the USPTO received 1,310
requests, a massive increase.64 An estimated 12% of litigated patents has been subject to
petition,65 and about 25% of challenged patent claims have been invalidated,66 while 84% of
patents to reach a final decision have been.67
India features two ways to challenge the validity of issued patents ‐ post‐grant
oppositions before the patent offices and patent revocation proceedings that may be initiated
before the Intellectual Property Appeal Board or via a counterclaim in an infringement suit. It
also offers pre‐grant opposition procedures that can be initiated by any third party on a broad
set of grounds.68 In China post‐grant review is the only option to invalidate a patent, court relief
is not available. Thus, the only way to invalidate a patent is through the Chinese Patent Office
(SIPO)’s Patent Review and Adjudication Board (PRAB) which corresponds to the PTAB in the
US. Uniquely, SIPO can also decide on infringement.69
Part III. Disharmonies between the Laws as Implemented and the Laws as Applied (the Case
of Patent Quality)
The final and perhaps least appreciated form of disharmony is also the most important
to individual rightsholders – what happens when the same claim to patent rights is evaluated by
different jurisdictions? Even if country formulations of the law vary, what matters is whether,
when applied, they produce consistent or inconsistent outcomes, the most important of which
are the rights and remedies available. In this section we consider patent application outcomes,
focusing in particular on the submission of a single patent application to multiple patent offices,
as a way to measure the extent of harmony or disharmony between the laws on the books and
the laws applied.
Take for example US Patent 6,032,137, which covers a way of depositing a check by
imaging and sending it, rather than physically transferring it to the bank. 70 The inventor,
Claudio Ballard, tried for several years to develop the invention. Though he failed, the
64

Chien & Helmers, supra note ___ at 3‐4.
UnifiedPatents, Outcomes at the PTAB (as of May 2015), http://unifiedpatents.com/outcomes‐at‐the‐ptab‐as‐of‐
may‐2015/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2016)
66
USPTO, Inter Partes Review Petitions Terminated to Date (Apr. 30, 2015),
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/inter_partes_review_petitions_%2004%2030%202015_0.pdf
, see also Colleen Chien, The Scariest Number in the Patent Reform Debate Is also Wrong, POLITICO (Jun. 3, 2015),
http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/06/the‐scariest‐number‐in‐the‐patent‐debate‐is‐also‐wrong‐000068
67
USPTO, Patent Trial and Appeal Board Update (Feb. 19, 2015), slide 15,
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/20150219_PPAC_PTAB_Update.pdf
68
Kapczynski, supra note __at 1598‐1600.
69
Chien & Helmers, supra note ___, at ___.
70
U.S Patent No. 6,032,137 (issued Feb 29, 2000).
65
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technology thrived, and his company, DataTreasury, sued dozens of banks for their use of check
imaging.71 In 2013, Fidelity National Information Services, after being sued by Ballard, asked the
USPTO to take a second look at the Ballard patents. It agreed. In 2015, a panel of patent judges
revoked the ‘137 patent as overly broad and vague, and therefore invalid.72 By that time
DataTreasury and its two employees had collected $350M in licensing fees.73 There is no
counterpart to this now‐invalidated patent in Europe though it was not for a lack of trying. The
application that matured into the US patent was also the basis of seven patent applications at
the EPO,74 but none were granted.75 While some applications were withdrawn from EPO
prosecution, others were denied.76
Previous efforts to measure what happens when the same patent application is
submitted to different patent offices report wide variability.77 Analyzing a cohort of patent
applications submitted to the Australian, European, and Japanese Patent Offices from 1990‐
1995 that matched as equivalents 9,618 US patents,78 Jensen and his colleagues found that the
Australian Patent Office granted almost all (86%) of these applications, while the JPO granted
less than half of them (42.6%) and the EPO grant rate was between (74%) these two figures.79
In a related analysis, Dietmar Harhoff and Stuart Graham analyzed the EPO counterparts of a
sample of 2,474 US patents litigated from 1963‐2003 and their nonlitigated counterparts, and
reported comparable grant rates, between EPO grant rates of 68% (among counterparts to non‐
litigated US patents) and 80% (among counterparts litigated US patents), as compared to US
patents (100% grant rate).80
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For a longer description and cites, See Chien, Cotter, and Posner, supra note ___ at Chapter 3.
Matthew Bultman, DataTreasury Patents Nixed by PTAB in AIA Review, LAW360 (Apr. 29, 2015),
http://www.law360.com/articles/649511/datatreasury‐patents‐nixed‐by‐ptab‐in‐aia‐review.
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Alex Lawson, Controversial DataTreasury Patents Face Biz Method Review, LAW360 (Nov. 8, 2013),
http://www.law360.com/articles/487185/controversial‐datatreasury‐patents‐face‐biz‐method‐review.
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See “also published as” section at http://www.google.com/patents/US6032137 (listing related applications
EP1008086A2,EP1008086A4, EP1688876A2,EP1688876A3, EP1986148A1,EP2267652A1, EP2267653A1)
75
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Author’s analysis based on the EP Register.
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Paul H. Jensen et al., Disharmony in International Patent Office Decisions, 15 Fed. Cir. B.J. 679 (2005); Elizabeth
Webster et al., Characteristics of International Patent Application Outcomes, 95 Econ. Letters 362, 368 (2007);
Alfons Palangkaraya et al., Misclassification between Patent Offices: Evidence from a Matched Sample of Patent
Applications, 93.3 Review of Econ. & Stat. 1063, 1075 (2011); Elizabeth Webster et al., Patent Examination
Outcomes and the National Treatment Principle, 45 The RAND J. Econ. 449, 469 (2014) (finding that local offices
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Paul H. Jensen, Application pendency times and outcomes across four patent offices (Intellectual Property
Research Institute of Australia Working Paper No. 01/08, Feb. 2008).
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analysis
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In an original analysis, we created a set of matched EPO – USPTO patent applications
from 2002. Patent rights are territorial, so an inventor seeking protection over the same
invention in multiple jurisdictions must file multiple applications. If an applicant for a US patent
also seeks protection in Europe, she will typically file the same application, with slight
modifications,81 within a year to the European Patent Office or World Intellectual Property
Office (WIPO). While there are numerous ways to associate US and EPO patent applications, in
our analysis we applied the most conservative approach and matched US patent documents to
EPO patent documents with identical priority claims.82 We included in our set all available EPO
and US application pairs from 200283 (N=99,221), and traced the fate of each application
through the two jurisdictions. We focused first on whether or not the application had been
“Granted,” a status designated in PATSTAT.84
Of applications filed in both jurisdictions, 77% were granted in the US, while only 52%
were granted in the EPO. The difference in grant rates was robust across all five invention
sectors tracked under the WIPO– in each case, more US than EPO patents resulted. Among
technology sectors, the differences were most pronounced for electrical engineering (or
“technology”) patents (FIG __). While electrical engineering applications had a less than one in
two chance of becoming a patent granted by the EPO, it had a greater than three out of four
chance of maturing into a US patent,85 a 34% difference. (FIG___) The difference was less
pronounced, but still significant for the other classes of patents. Chemistry and mechanical
engineering applications were 17%, and instruments applications, 29% more likely to be
awarded in the US as compared to the EPO. (FIG __)
protection than were equivalents of unlitigated patents (Stuart J.H. Graham & Dietmar Harhoff, Can Post‐Grant
Reviews Improve Patent System Design? A Twin Study of US and European Patents (Center for Economic Policy
Research Discussion Paper No. 5680, 2006))
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application. Subsequent applications can claim priority to one or more applications, within the same or different
jurisdictions, creating the possibility of multiple applications within a single patent “family.” A patent family, in
turn, can be either “simple” or “extended” – the members of a simple family share at least one common priority or
“parent,” while members of an extended family include documents linked directly or indirectly through common
priority claims. Patent families may also be formed through “expert‐review,” for example through priority
information as well as the review of content by experts as performed by the Derwent World Patent Index. See
Graham & Harhoff, supra note __; Catalina Martinez, Patent Families: When Do Definitions Really Matter, 86
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matches through the DOCDB database.
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Comparative Grant Rates
(N=99,221 Matched Application Pairs, filed in 2002)
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Source: PATSTAT 2015, Smoch/WIPO, author’s analysis [File: Slide 14 data]86
In every one of the 35 sector subcategories defined by WIPO, we found, the US was
more likely to grant a patent than was the EPO.87 However, it is possible that the results are an
artifact of the period of time tested, as the fluctuation in US grant rates over time has been
well‐documented. To rule out this possibility, we expanded our analysis to a sample that
included EPO applications matched to US grants from the period from 1975‐2014. We found
the relatively lower EPO grant rate to persist over time, consistent with the findings of Cecil
Quillen and Christopher Cotropia,88 and observed that the relative EPO grant rate, in fact,
declined over the tested period, though we believe some of the decline is due to time effects.
These results confirm and expand upon earlier results.89
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The pervasiveness of the gap in grant rates across technology areas between the two
jurisdictions is striking. They contribute to a significant level of disharmony in the protections
available in specific countries, despite similar, harmonized standards. One major difference that
contributes to this difference is the bifurcation of search and examination in Europe, as
compared to the unification of these steps in the US.
Though our analysis was limited to US and European applications, Bhaven Sampat and
Ken Shadlen, in a forthcoming study, follow the filing and grant of about 277 “twin” drug patent
applications filed in six jurisdictions: India, Brazil, the US, Japan, the European Patent Office,
South Africa, Mexico, and Argentina.90 They coded the claims of each application as primary
(covering new molecules) or secondary (covering alternative forms of existing molecules) and
examine how national grant rates for these types of patents differ. Since overall grant rates can
be influenced by the quality of filings, their analyses focus on “twin” applications filed in all six
jurisdictions.
They find that, consistent with the results reported earlier, the US has the highest grant
rate among patent applications, being the most likely, after South Africa, to grant patents on
both primary and secondary drug patents. They also find that although India and Brazil have
enacted specific measures to restrict patenting of secondary drug inventions,91 these measures
have had little direct effect on patent examination outcomes. Though grant rates in these
countries are lower than in the US, grant rates on secondary patents are not measurably lower
than grant rates on primary drug patents.
These results underscore that although government negotiators can agree with each
other on the provisions of international agreements, many other factors shape the extent to
which countries can in fact rely on the consistent and uniform availability of rights.
CONCLUSION
Multilateral trade agreements are appealing for lawmakers and constituents with
special, asymmetric access to negotiators because they appear to be a much faster way to
effect sweeping reform than going country by country or through open processes.92 But those
who negotiate and agree to a treaty’s terms are different than those who must implement its
provisions, and likewise the gaps between the minimum standards that are negotiated and
90
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and India, (Columbia and NBER) (September 28, 2015)
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patent office unless the Brazilian health ministry also approves, and the agency responsible for making these
decisions (ANVISA) gives prior consent.”
92
See, e.g. Margot E. Kaminski, The Capture of International Intellectual Property Law through the U.S. Trade
Regime
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compliance with them, differences between the substantive principles agreed to and the actual
laws that implement them (and the procedural contexts in which they operate), and differences
between the laws as enacted and the laws that are applied, as documented in this essay are
significant. Those who advocate for and against such agreements might keep these realities in
mind, and be cautious about overstating their likely benefits, as well as their harms.

